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The ability to draw the right lessons from the First World War has been 
pinpointed as a key factor in the military effectiveness of armed forces 
in the inter-war period. Estonia can be seen as another case of a country 
leaning on the concepts and practices that had brought success in the 
previous war but rendered anachronistic by the rapid social and mili-
tary developments preceding the Second World War. However, as the 
Estonian leadership chose not to fight in 1939-1940, estimates of the 
Estonian army’s fighting power rest on indirect evidence and will always 
remain speculative. The decision to capitulate before the overwhelming 
power of the Soviet Union can even be interpreted as a sign of pru-
dence and recognition of the limitations of a small country. On the other 
hand, the trumping up of the myths and the spirit of the Independence 
War, questionable operational and tactical ideas displayed by the army 
commanders, and the unimaginative and overoptimistic scenarios at 
army manoeuvers that were noted by foreign military attachés, do call 
for a critical analysis of the Estonian imaginations and preparations for 
future war in the 1930s.
For more than two decades since glasnost and the end of Communist his-
toriography, Estonian historians have been studying the country’s readi-
ness for war in the autumn of 1939. The focus of researchers has been 
directed at two problems. First, why did Estonia not resist? In this respect, 
Estonia’s decisions have been compared to those of Finland. The northern 
neighbour was in a comparable political-strategic situation (although it 
was a larger country), but decided to resist the Soviet Union militarily, 
while Estonia, and also Latvia and Lithuania, chose to sign mutual assis-
tance pacts allowing Moscow to establish military bases on their territory. 
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This compromised Baltic defences and made their later annexation by 
the USSR, completed in August 1940, a much easier prospect. Finland, 
however, fought two wars and remained independent.
The difference from Finland has raised questions about the military 
effectiveness of the authoritarian regime that Estonia (and also Latvia and 
Lithuania) had established after the coup d’état of 1934. Historians have 
asked about the “moral right” of the authoritarian leaders, primarily Pres-
ident Konstantin Päts and the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General 
Johan Laidoner, to take decisions affecting the fate of the entire nation 
without consulting the people.1 This has been the grounds for criticism 
by the Finnish historian Martti Turtola, but also for example from the 
Estonian political scientist Rein Taagepera. Taagepera notes among other 
1 According to most authors these were “authoritarian regimes,” Andres Kasekamp, A His-
tory of the Baltic States (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 111–2. However, 
the political scientist Rein Taagepera uses the term “dictatorship,” Rein Taagepera, Maa ja laul: 
Sada aastat Eesti poliitikat (manuscript in author’s possession).
President Konstantin Päts (to the right) and General Johan Laidoner  
(with the cigarette) inspecting manoeuvres. Courtesy: The Society  
of Estonians in Sweden, Estonian Film Archive
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things that Estonia had not been abandoned by potential allies in Sep-
tember 1939, as has been claimed, but decided to act alone even before 
anyone could offer assistance. From 1918 to 1919 Estonia had been a pil-
lar of strength, on which Latvia could lean. Now, in 1939, Estonia proved 
to be the “weak link whose capitulation also demoralised the southern 
neighbours”. For Taagepera, Päts was not a dictator fostering militarism; 
Laidoner worried about defence, but in reality economised on defence in 
the 1930s. The purge of internal enemies was more important than build-
ing fortifications and purchasing new armaments for the army, Taagepera 
claims.2
The second important line of enquiry has concerned military affairs, 
but not primarily the art of war, but the technical side of warfare and sys-
tems of mobilization. As a result of this research, we know the structure 
and the organization of the Estonian defence forces in peace time, and 
their likely wartime deployment. Historian Toe Nõmm began researching 
the armaments of the Estonian army and the development of the Esto-
nian defence industry already at the end of the 1980s.3 Largely due to 
Nõmm’s prolific work we have ample data about the equipment of the 
Estonian army. In the 1930s, the main effort was not directed at procuring 
new weapons, but at updating old ammunition neglected in the 1920s. As 
a result of these largely invisible efforts, the Estonian situation in terms 
of ammunition was probably the best among the Baltic countries (includ-
ing Finland), at least relative to the number of soldiers. Stocks were large 
enough to wage a war the size of the Finnish–Soviet Winter War, 1939–
2 Martti Turtola, President Konstantin Päts: Eesti ja Soome teed; transl. by Maimu Berg (Tal-
linn: Tänapäev, 2003); Martti Turtola, Kindral Johan Laidoner ja Eesti Vabariigi hukk 1939–
1940; transl. by Maimu Berg (Tallinn: Tänapäev, 2008); Taagepera, Maa ja laul. But compare 
with Seppo Zetterberg, Eesti ajalugu (Lohkva: Tänapäev, 2009), 418, 478–479.
3 Toe Nõmm, “Eesti Vabariigi kaitseväest 1939–1940,” Akadeemia 3 (1989): 585–599; “Eesti 
kaitseküsimusest,” Postimees (9. oktoober 1991), 4; “Browning 1903 ja Eesti sõjaväepüstolid 
1918–1940,” – Laidoneri Muuseumi aastaraamat 2001, ed. Leho Lõhmus (Tallinn: Laidoneri 
muuseum, 2002), 102–114; “Arsenali püstolkuulipilduja,” – Laidoneri Muuseumi aastaraamat 
2002, ed. Leho Lõhmus (Tallinn: Laidoneri muuseum, 2003); 129–142; “Eesti tankitõrje 1940. 
aastani,” – Laidoneri Muuseumi aastaraamat 2003, ed. Leho Lõhmus (Tallinn: Laidoneri muu-
seum, 2004), 106–133; “Eesti sõjaväe varustus, sõjatööstus ja relvastuspoliitika,” – Sõja ja rahu 
vahel I. Eesti julgeolekupoliitika 1940. aastani, ed. Enn Tarvel, Tõnu Tannberg (Tallinn: S-Kes-
kus, 2004), 226–264.
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1940.4 However, weapons were mostly old, originating from the period of 
the First World War. For example, there were 234,000 shells, but artillery 
pieces were obsolete. The modern howitzers that Estonia ordered were 
never delivered, and would have needed new shells anyway.
Estonia had probably the best anti-tank gun parks in the Baltics, but 
almost no mortars. Air defence was considered the weakest link: twelve 
new Bofors 40mm AA-cannons that were acquired before the war were 
literally a drop in the ocean. The new German 20mm, 75mm and 37mm 
cannons were delivered too late, in 1940, to have an impact on the Esto-
nian defence policy, which had by the time become entirely dependent 
on the USSR.5 But perhaps the greatest weakness was the fact that the 
Estonian army had not been able to standardise its weapons systems, so 
by the end of the 1930s it had an extraordinary mixture of different types 
and calibres. Lack of resources had prohibited the transition to British 
weapons in the 1920s. When the government eventually began modernis-
ing its armaments in the latter half of the 1930s, it was already too late.6 
For too long the country had tried to live on the stocks assembled in the 
victorious Independence War of 1918–1920.
Urmas Salo has researched Estonian defence planning in the 1930s. 
He emphasises the importance of the coup d’état of 1934. Assuring the 
army’s support for the authoritarian regime, General Laidoner in return 
received a free hand to organize defences.7 He immediately began a fight 
against pessimism toward the Estonian capability for defence, which had 
taken root during the economic depression, and began to nurture a new 
fighting spirit drawing on the experience of the Independence War.
Salo also shows that already in the first year of the authoritarian 
regime, Laidoner introduced new operational concepts, which however 
were never clearly systematized and codified, but voiced either orally or 
4 Toe Nõmm, “Eesti relvad Teise maailmasõja eel,” Tehnikamaailm 8 (2008): 62–64; “Eesti 
relvad 1918–1940,” Tehnikamaailm 6 (2008): 116–119.
5 Mika Raudvassar, “Õhukaitse Suurtükiväegrupp 1928–1940,” KVÜÕA Toimetised 3 (2004): 
208–234.
6 Nõmm, “Eesti relvad”.
7 The British Foreign Office thought that the new constitution of 1938 confirmed the position 
of the army as a pillar of support for the regime, “Estonia. Annual Report, 1938,” FO 371/22226, 
National Archives, United Kingdom (hereafter: NA).
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in stray writings by Laidoner and his confidants. In 1934, battle tours 
were organized for senior officers to border regions close to Russia. 
These were the areas of operations of the 1st and the 2nd division, near 
Narva in the North-East and in the border districts of South-East Esto-
nia, respectively. Laidoner referred to the smallness of the Estonian ter-
ritory, to the advantageous geography at the borders, and emphasised 
that Estonia must not abandon even an inch of its land without a fight. 
Defence had to be active, because the enemy could be defeated only by 
offensive action.
In November 1936, Laidoner gave an order to stop practicing the 
tactics of withdrawal. In a directive issued on 14 September 1938, the 
C-in-C ordered that war operations were to be transferred to enemy ter-
ritory immediately after the start of the war, just as had been done in the 
War of Independence nineteen years earlier.8 Urmas Salo suggests that 
these plans were unrealistic. Because Estonia had no allies, it would have 
been impossible to deliver successful counterattacks or to push the line 
of defence into the territory of the Soviet Union. Salo concludes that Lai-
doner’s ideas may have had a positive impact on morale, but they were 
impossible to implement in practice. The will to fight for the country’s 
independence was probably strong, but in the final analysis was of little 
use in 1939.9
The critique of Urmas Salo is to the point. However, it is important 
to distinguish levels of war: it is one thing to deliver counter-attacks, 
another matter to push the enemy back to enemy territory by a general 
counter-offensive. The first is primarily in the realm of tactics, the other 
an operational and a strategic matter. From the tactical point of view, 
counter-attacks are perfectly reasonable and in case of enemy incursions 
even necessary.10 For example, Finnish success in the Winter War could 
be partly explained by the ability to counter-attack an enemy’s exposed 
8 Laidoner’s diary for 18 September 1938, cited by Urmas Salo, “Eesti kaitse üldised põhimõt-
ted,” – Sõja ja rahu vahel, 168–170.
9 Salo, “Eesti kaitse üldised põhimõtted,” 170.
10 About executing counter-attacks, see the current Estonian manual, Enno Mõts, Eesti kait-
seväe maaväe lahingutegevuse alused: maaväe ohvitseride ja staabitöö väljaõppejuhend (Tartu: 
Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused, 2010), 108, 121.
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flanks with small but mobile units. This allowed the Finnish army to 
encircle and destroy, by the so-called motti-tactics, much larger Red 
Army groupings.11 At the same time, one should agree with Salo that a 
counter-offensive on the entire front would have been beyond the ability 
of the Estonian army.
Urmas Salo rightly notes that currently there are no studies about 
the mentality of the Estonian army in the 1930s.12 Nevertheless, there are 
studies on officer education and training,13 and a start has been made on 
researching Estonian theories of war.14 Because of the lack of studies on 
mentality, war theory, and operational concepts, analysis of the Estonian 
defence capability have remained superficial. We may know the number 
of rifles and cannons, estimate potential firepower, but without knowing 
tactical methods and operational concepts it is impossible to assess mili-
tary effectiveness in a meaningful way.
The objective of this article is not to speculate about the possibilities 
of defending Estonia in 1939–1940, or to present another scenario and 
likely outcome of the “autumn war” of 1939, which is now a popular topic 
in “alternative history” books.15 Rather, this article will explore the role of 
historical experience in the visions of war of the Estonian high command, 
especially of General Laidoner. What were the effects of the Independence 
War on the mentality and the operational thinking of senior officers? The 
article will analyse the core ideas of Laidoner’s doctrine of “active defence”.
11 Pasi Tuunainen, Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War 1939–1940 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2016), 99–115.
12 Urmas Salo, “Kaitseväe korralduse areng,” Sõja ja rahu vahel, 179. The exception is Igor 
Kopõtin, “Reichswehri identiteedikriis: selle mõjud ja kajastamine Eestis aastatel 1919–1934 
[The identity crisis in the Reichswehr: its influence on and reflection in the Estonian Army in 
1919–1934],” Ajalooline Ajakiri. The Estonian Historical Journal 1 (2016): 103–132.
13 Andres Seene, “Eesti sõjaväe ohvitseride ettevalmistamise süsteemi kujunemine ja areng 
1919–1940” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation: University of Tartu, 2011); Taavi Urb, “Eesti 
merejõudude ohvitseride väljaõpe aastatel 1919–1940” (Unpublished MA Thesis: University of 
Tartu, 2015).
14 For Estonian ideas on sea power, see Liivo Laanetu, “Eesti meresõjalise mõtte kullafond,” 
ENDC Occasional Papers, 3 (2015): 9–95.
15 Mart Laar, Sügissõda 1939. 1. osa, Punane torm tõuseb (Tallinn: Read, 2014); Mart Laar, 
Sügissõda 1939. 2. osa, Käsi mõõgaga (Tallinn: Read, 2016); Hanno Ojalo, 1939: kui me valinuks 
sõja (Tallinn: Grenader, 2010).
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The article will also study the exercises of the Estonian armed forces, 
focusing on two larger manoeuvers in 1937 and 1938. Those manoeuvers 
have been chosen for the reason that, by coincidence, summaries of reports 
by British military attaches on those exercises have been preserved in the 
National Archives of the United Kingdom. In addition, there is a survey 
and an analysis of the reports of Swedish military attaches by the Swedish 
military historian Fredrik Eriksson.16 This way it is possible to compare 
the assessments of Estonian army commanders with the assessments of 
foreign observers, which will give a more objective ground from which 
to judge on the tactical and operational effectiveness of the Estonian 
army.
One should add that unavoidably these estimates will remain quite 
speculative, because the true test for military effectiveness always remains 
war itself, not exercises.17 At the same time, one should not underestimate 
the importance of training. According to some theorists, the military 
effectiveness of the “West” has throughout history been based on profes-
sionalism based on rigorous and long drills. The Roman army remained 
unbeaten almost for a thousand years, and not because of superior tech-
nology, but primarily due to harsh training; the advances of the Weh-
rmacht in the initial stages of the Second World War were not the result 
of some technological edge but of realistic training.18 Therefore, one may 
presume that also the Estonian army exercises reflected actual combat 
capabilities. But first one should look at the military culture in more gen-
eral terms. Was Estonia, as a result of the victory in the Independence 
16 Fredrik Eriksson, “Coping with a New Security Situation – Swedish Military Attachés in the 
Baltic 1919–1939,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 15:2 (2013): 33–69.
17 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With fear of change (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011), 1–36.
18 About Western superiority, Geoffrey Parker, “The Western Way of War,” – The Cambridge 
Illustrated History of Warfare: The triumph of the West, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), 2–9; and a more modest assessment: John France, Perilous 
Glory, The rise of Western military power (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2011). 
For the Roman army a useful overview is Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 38–45. About 
Blitzkrieg, Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and training in the German Army, 
1920–1939 (Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 1999); and more precisely about training, James 
S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German military reform (Kansas: Uni-
versity Press of Kansas, 1992), 68–96.
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War, affected by a mentality of satisfaction and conservativism character-
ising other victorious powers after the First World War?
Defence will and morale
There are many studies on the inability of Britain and France, the main 
victorious powers, to draw adequate conclusions from the experiences 
of the First World War, to make accurate predictions and adopt the right 
tactics and organization for new technological possibilities. Admittedly, 
some of the British and French mistakes can be explained by pacifism 
caused by the heavy losses in the war, but others were clearly the result of 
the confidence and conservativism grounded in victory.19
Was this a problem in Estonia? It is evident that the Independence 
War had much influence already for the fact that a large part of the officer 
corps developed and matured in that war. Estonian historian Liisi Esse 
has shown that the memory of the Independence War overshadowed 
memories of the First World War.20 Sõdur (Soldier), the main military 
journal in Estonia, devoted considerable space to the Independence War, 
whereas the Great War was almost entirely forgotten.
At the same time it seems that because of Estonia’s geography, feelings 
of insecurity and fear before the Soviet Union were great and this factor 
never allowed Estonia to rest on the laurels of victory. This is confirmed 
by a testimony from a British observer, lieutenant general Sir Francis 
Poitiers Nosworthy, who visited the Baltic region from 9 May to 2 June 
1924. The British general stayed in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
capitals for two days each. His impression was:
19 About the French military innovation, Robert A. Doughty, “The French Armed Forces, 
1918–1940,” – Military Effectiveness. Volume II, The interwar period, ed. Allan R. Millett and 
Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 39–69; and British developments, Brian 
Bond and Williamson Murray, “The British Armed Forces, 1918–1940,” – Ibid., 98–130.
20 Liisi Esse, “Suure sõja mäletamine: kirjad, päevikud ja mälestused eestlaste sõjakogemuse 
avajana,” – Sõdurite kirju, päevikuid ja mälestusi Esimesest maailmasõjast, ed. Tõnu Tannberg 
(Tartu: Rahvusarhiiv, 2015), 21–29.
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... in spite of the success which had so far attended their efforts to get 
their armed forces efficiently organized and trained and in spite of their 
present financial stability and apparently sound economic position, 
there was still a strong undercurrent of uneasiness concerning their 
ability to continue their state of independence indefinitely. They appear 
to live in perpetual fear of RUSSIA [here and elsewhere emphasis in 
original], and ... it seems certain that as soon as RUSSIA begins to settle 
down, we shall have to deal with constant alarms and appeals for aid 
from these states.21
It is somewhat surprising that the fear of Soviet Russia was already so great 
even before the communist attempt at coup d’état in December 1924.22 
The insecurity of the 1920s increased with the Great Depression and the 
impressive Soviet program of industrialisation and military modernisa-
tion in the early 1930s. According to Urmas Salo, the prognosis of the 
general staff of the Defence Forces in 1933 was pessimistic. It was thought 
that without strong resistance the newly established “moto-mechanized” 
units of the Red Army could advance as much as fifty to a hundred of 
kilometres a day. It was feared that even in case of strong defence, in the 
South-East the enemy would be able to capture Petseri in the first day, 
Võru in the second or third day, and Põlva (about fifty kilometres from 
the border) in the fourth day. In case of a surprise attack at the Narva 
front in the North East, Narva was expected to fall in the first day (some 
ten kilometres from the front line), Vaivara in the second. The enemy 
would reach the line of the Pühajõe River in Toila region in the fourth 
day, so some forty kilometres inside friendly territory.23
The domination of pessimistic estimates is confirmed by the reports 
of Swedish military attachés for the early 1930s. The Swedish representa-
tive captain Juhlin-Dannfelt met the Estonian chief of staff Major General 
Juhan Tõrvand in February 1933. Tõrvand did not place much hope in 
21 “Visit to the Baltic states, 9 May – 2 June 1924,” WO 106/1573, NA.
22 Nosworthy’s report from 1925 tells that the Bolshevik attempt at coup d’état had further 
increased feelings of insecurity, “Report on Tour of Baltic states and Scandinavia, July–August 
1925,” WO 106/1574, NA. 
23 Salo, “Eesti kaitseväe valmisolek sõjaks,” 95.
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the Estonian ability to resist if the Russians attacked, and he considered 
a Russian attack inevitable. The general tone of Tõrvand was character-
ised by hopelessness and even despair. According to the historian Fredrik 
Eriksson, Tõrvand thus confirmed the Swedish strategic perception that 
after a respite the USSR would solve the Baltic problem with a mathe-
matic certainty.24
Because of the existential fears dominating in the region, it is difficult 
to believe that the Estonian army was complacent about the future. It is 
noteworthy that the journal Sõdur was zealous to observe the develop-
ment of the military systems of other European countries and to learn 
from not only the first-class militaries of the great powers but also from 
the experience of smaller countries. Sõdur, which since 1924 was appear-
ing once a week, had considerable impact on the mentality of officers and 
24 Eriksson, “Swedish Military Attachés,” 36.
Estonian officers on manoeuvres near the cemetery of Old Izborsk looking 
toward the Estonian-Russian border in the East. The village is now in Russia. 
Courtesy: Estonian Film Archive
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soldiers.25 At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s a lot 
of attention was paid to small nations like Switzerland and Belgium that 
had comparable defence systems. Constantly there appeared surveys and 
analyses of the doctrines, technologies, exercises and war theories of the 
military heavy weights, France, Britain, the USSR, Poland and others.26
From the point of view of military thought, Estonia was part of overall 
European trends. How effectively those ideas were implemented should 
be further researched, however. At this stage it suffices to say that Esto-
nian officers were not ill-educated or unintelligent as inferred by Swedish 
attachés accredited to the Baltic states.27 Perhaps the Swedish conserva-
tive officers considered all Baltic soldiers of peasant stock as a priori less 
educated than their European colleagues of a higher social class. Cultural 
prejudices were strong. For example, Swedish observers considered the 
Finnish army as better than the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armies, 
primarily because the Finnish officer corps still included a high number 
of Swedish noblemen. It needs to be mentioned, though, that peasant ori-
gins could in some context also be regarded as a mark of quality. In gen-
eral, the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Finns were highly 
regarded as good soldiers for their strong physique and stamina unspoilt 
by an urban environment.28
Reports by Swedish attachés confirm that the morale of the Estonian 
army leadership was low in the beginning of the 1930s. Hopelessness and 
uncertainty are not the best grounds for successful resistance against a 
stronger enemy. In military history there are many examples about the 
importance of morale on the outcome of war. The Argentinian contingent 
on the island of East Falkland was defeated by a considerably smaller but 
25 Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti sõjaväes,” 109–110. It is likely that after the coup only 
those articles that the regime approved of could be published in Sõdur, as the journal was cen-
sored by the political police.
26 J. Tõrvand, “Riigikaitse muredest” (1930), appeared in numbers 14–16, 19–20, 23–24, 25–26 
and 50–52; A. Traksmann, “Riikliku julgeoleku küsimusi,” Sõdur 1-2 (1930), 1–10 and Sõdur 
3-4 (1930), 69–78. In some units, foreign military journals were available even in soldiers’ 
libraries (Mika Raudvassar’s information to the author).
27 Eriksson, “Swedish Military Attachés,” 41.
28 Ibid., 58. It appears that contemporary concerns about the fragile physique of youngsters 
from urban environments are not so new.
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motivated British expedition force in 1982. The Battle of Thermopylae of 
480 BC belongs to the canon of military classics. In Estonian military his-
tory one could refer to the collapse of the Russian defence of Saaremaa in 
the German operation Albion in 1917, or the retreat of the Estonian army 
from Tartu before the invading Red Army in the Estonian Independence 
War in 1918.29
One can therefore agree with General Laidoner that low morale was 
a dangerous tendency and had to be purged from the army. In 1939, 
Laidoner presented a report about his activities in the past five years, 
emphasising that before assuming responsibility as the C-in-C, the “oper-
ational thinking of the responsible leadership of the army… had become 
unhealthy”. According to Laidoner, resistance against the Red Army had 
been considered essentially hopeless, and two “peculiar psychoses” had 
paralyzed the armed forces, the “tank psychosis” and the “withdrawal 
psychosis”. Due to the underrating of the possibility to fight at borders, 
the emphasis was placed on delaying defensive tactics and on trading 
space for time. It was assumed that the Soviet offensive would begin with-
out pre-warning and that Soviet tank and moto-mechanised units would 
easily overrun the Estonian infantry. If Laidoner’s description of the situ-
ation before 1934 was true – and we saw above that it was at least partly 
true – it was sensible to try to overcome the excessive pessimism.
One has to emphasize, however, that military morale does not rest 
as much on abstract ideas or values, factors that can collapse quickly 
under combat stress, but most importantly on professionalism, which is 
grounded in years of drill, and on the cohesion of units resulting from 
hard and realistic training as a group. The British military historian Hew 
Strachan notes that political or ideological indoctrination is important 
when the soldier is recruited, but it loses its importance at the front. 
29 Antonius CGM Robben, “Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Twentieth-Century 
Argentinian Warfare,”  Journal of Contemporary History 41:2 (2006): 357–377, here 369–370. 
France, Perilous Glory, 55. Apart from the favourable landscape, morale and discipline obvi-
ously played a key part in the Greek performance at Thermopylae. About operation Albion, 
Nikolai Reek, Saaremaa kaitsmine ja vallutamine a. 1917 (La Défense et la conquête de l'île 
Saaremaa en 1917) (Tallinn, 1937), about the fall of Tartu, Reigo Rosenthal, Laidoner – väejuht: 
Johan Laidoner kõrgema operatiivjuhi ja strateegia kujundajana Eesti Vabadussõjas (Tallinn: 
Argo, 2008).
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In extreme battle stress, involving fear and fatigue, training is far more 
important than ideological commitment, as it allows soldiers to fall back 
on drills and procedures instilled through years of training. The psycho-
logical readiness to kill is no less important.30 
In a study on the motivation of Argentinian soldiers in the Falk-
lands War, the Dutch cultural anthropologist Antonius C.G. Robben 
has reached conclusions similar to those of Strachan: one should sepa-
rate battle motivation from reasons why men go to war. Robben cites an 
Argentinian conscript: “All the English soldiers had received at least three 
years’ training. And however much patriotism you put in, you can’t fight 
that.” And an Argentinian special-forces combatant observed: “One only 
fights because one has confidence in one’s own ability and that of one’s 
comrades”.31 Applying these observations and experiences to the condi-
tions in Estonia in the 1930s, one could argue that the Estonian defence 
will may have been high, but this does not by itself say much about the 
actual readiness to fight the enemy in combat.
To sum up, Estonia had existential fears before Soviet Russia and was 
not resting on the laurels of the victorious Independence War. The prob-
lem was that the rise of the military might of the USSR and its attack 
on the Baltic states seemed inevitable, and this seemed to paralyze the 
thinking of the Estonian military authorities. Laidoner’s effort to instil 
self-confidence was reasonable. But the question is whether it was correct 
to draw on the experience of the Independence War to raise the morale 
and develop defence doctrines?
The legacy of the Independence War
There were several motives for nurturing the myth of the Independence 
War in the Estonian armed forces in the inter-war period. Facing an 
uncertain future people often seek comfort in memories of the glorious 
30 Hew Strachan, “Training, Morale and Modern War,” Journal of Contemporary History 41:2 
(2006): 211–227. The last problem beset Ukrainian soldiers in the beginning of the Ukrainian-
Russian war in 2014.
31 Robben, “Combat Motivation,” 76–77.
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past. There were also practical advantages in nourishing the experience 
of the Independence War. It had been fought on the Estonian territory 
against the enemy that was the expected adversary also in the next war, 
thus many tactical lessons could be drawn.
The problem was that the Independence War had not been particu-
larly modern. Estonian officers were outraged when a professor of tactics 
at the Estonian War Academy, former general of the Russian imperial 
army Gleb Vannovski noted that this had been a “gypsies’ war”.32 The con-
text of the quip is unknown and therefore one can only speculate about its 
intent but probably this was a graphic way of saying that in comparison 
with the First World War the Independence War had not been a “real” 
war. Leaving aside the racist undertone, the general was probably right. 
For the nature of the tactics and operations, troop concentrations, and 
the technology used, the Independence War was far inferior to the First 
World War, particularly to operations on the Western front. It was not 
a modern conventional war but a mobile partisan war of the pre-First 
World War type (despite the use of some modern technologies, like air-
craft; tanks never reached the front).
Toward the end of the 1930s, the leading revisionist powers Germany 
and the USSR developed new operational doctrines and made a qualita-
tive leap in new technologies in mechanised forces, air forces and com-
munications. As a result, it was questionable how much one could rely on 
the experience of the First World War. The pitfalls of sticking to obsolete 
tactical and operational models were clearly shown in the defeats of the 
French and the British forces by the Wehrmacht in 1940. In the same year, 
the Estonian general staff estimated that the Estonian regiment was too 
weak to fight a modern regiment, and that the standard equipment of an 
Estonian regiment was roughly equal to that of the First World War regi-
ment of 1916.33 Factoring in tactical and operational methods, the assess-
ment could have been even more pessimistic. 
Despite all this, the Estonian armed forces continued to cultivate the 
myth of the Independence War throughout the inter-war period.  General 
32 Vannovski’s quote was from 1921, Nikolai Reek, “Võrdlevaid jooni Prantsuse sõjaväe kasva-
tusest,” Sõdur 52 (1925), 1107–1109.
33 Salo, “Eesti kaitseväe valmisolek sõjaks,” 48.
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Laidoner’s right hand, the chief of staff General Nikolai Reek had always 
emphasised the importance of the Independence War in military edu-
cation and war doctrines. In 1925 he intervened in polemics about the 
teaching techniques of the Russian emigres who had been used as mili-
tary experts as long as Estonia lacked the necessary expertise. Former 
Russian officers were commissioned with the task of beginning higher 
military education in Estonia. Besides Vannovski, one of the notable pro-
fessors was Lieutenant General Aleksey Baiov, who had taught several 
future Estonian senior officers at the Nikolai General Staff Academy in St. 
Petersburg before the war. Soon, however, the teaching practices intro-
duced by the Russians were subjected to vigorous critique. Aleksey Baiov 
was forced to leave in 1926.34 Many people had voiced the concern that 
their teaching methods did not meet modern standards. Reek cited patri-
otic education at the École Supérieure de Guerre (where Reek had studied 
from 1923 to 1925) in Paris as a model, and came out decisively against 
attempts to belittle the Independence War, which he said had been a 
“turning point” for the whole nation. “The education of our armed forces 
should first and foremost be the responsibility of people who have belief 
in the existence of our country, and whose burning patriotism enlivens all 
the subjects [taught in the academy],” Reek wrote.35 In other words, Reek 
thought that ideology and indoctrination trumped military professional-
ism and competency.
In the journal Sõdur there were lively discussions about the impor-
tance of patriotic education. The general staff officer Aleksandr Jaakson 
thought, for example, that Estonia had to draw on the example of the Red 
Army and institute ideology as the basis of education, in which Com-
munism would be replaced by the national ideal.36 This was a dangerous 
tendency for the development of the Estonian army, even as the scepti-
34 Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti sõjaväes,” 226–230. One of the reasons for conflict 
was also the openly monarchistic and anti-Estonian views of Baiov.
35 Reek, “Võrdlevaid jooni”.
36 Aleksandr Jaakson, “Rahvusline aade kui meie sõjaväe kasvatuse alus,” Sõdur 51-52 (1924), 
5–6, cited by Igor Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti sõjaväes aastatel 1918–1940 vähemus-
rahvuste näitel” (Manuscript of the Phd Thesis, University of Tallinn, 2017), 113 (I am grateful 
to Igor Kopõtin for permission to cite the manuscript of his dissertation).
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cism about the Russian professor’s teaching practices was probably well 
grounded.
Along with the emphasis on nationalism and patriotism, history was 
used for ideological purposes. This could be seen in Sõdur, in handbooks 
and regulations. In lectures on military pedagogics, Lieutenant Colonel 
August Kasekamp, the commander of the War Academy, emphasised 
that national consciousness should be at the core of the moral strength 
of Estonians as soldiers. The Independence War, he pointed out, was the 
most heroic period in the nation’s history and especially “healing” for 
the sense of nationality. The war had to be taught to soldiers and officers. 
Moreover, in company reading rooms there had to be “corners for the 
War of Independence,” modelled on Lenin’s corners in the Red Army.37
Alfred Luts, editor in chief of Sõdur and a close comrade of Reek, 
was keen to create an image of the Estonian man as an archetypical and 
racially suitable soldier since the “freedom struggles” of the 13th century:
The ancient troops and navies of the Estonians were able to organize 
themselves in battle so that they could achieve miracles [this and the next 
emphasis by author] despite their inferiority in numbers.... The superior 
military spirit, which developed already in the ancient times of freedom 
and which was hardened in the Independence War, is the main basis of 
our current army. This factor is the guarantee that the Estonian armed 
forces will be able to defend the independence of Estonia in the future 
and is prepared to fight for it until the last breath.38
In this writing, historical consciousness is regarded as the key compo-
nent of military effectiveness. As noted earlier, however, “high spirits” or 
memory of earlier victories is hardly helpful in battle. One cannot hope 
for miracles – even as miraculous stories about Aleksandr Matrossov 
were promoted in the Soviet Union – and should emphasise training that 
allows one to keep a cool head even in close combat.
37 August Kasekamp, Sõjapedagoogika. Loengukonspekt Sõjakooli kadettide vanemklassis 
1930/31. a. (KVÜÕA: Tallinn, 1931), 36–41, cited by Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti 
sõjaväes,” 119–121, 189.
38 Major Alfred Luts, “Eesti sõjavägi minevikus ja kaasajal,” Sõdur 7-8 (1938), 180–186; Juhan 
Vasar, “Eestlaste ülivõim Baltimerel 12. sajandil,” Sõdur 30-32 (1930), 952–55.
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The importance of the Independence War also lied in the fact that it 
helped legitimize the rule of President Konstantin Päts and the C-in-C 
General Laidoner after the coup d’état of 1934. Both had been key actors 
in the Independence War, Laidoner as C-in-C and Päts as prime minis-
ter and minister of war. The Independence War was also the pillar prop-
ping up the authority of Nikolai Reek, who had distinguished himself 
as the chief of staff of the 3rd Division. Immediately after the coup d’état, 
the new leaders instituted the Victory Day as a national holiday, mark-
ing the victory over the Germans in the battle of Cecis in June 1919. 
Reek had served as the operational commander in that battle. After 
1934, work on collecting recollections and compiling an official his-
tory of the war, as well as propaganda among the population at large, 
was intensified; monuments were erected all over the country. Soldiers 
had to complete tests on the history of the Independence War to prove 
their loyalty.39
However, let us return to the influence of the Independence War on 
tactical and operational thinking. There is little doubt that the war repre-
sented the “horizon of expectations”40 from which Laidoner and his asso-
ciates viewed the future. In a lecture at the graduation ceremony of the 
War Academy on 1 September 1938 General Laidoner said: “Everything 
develops so fast. Where should one look for the right principles. The only 
and the greatest source is the history of wars and history in general. Those 
we have to study.”41 Military history but especially the Independence War 
39 Karsten Brüggemann, “Võidupüha. Võnnu lahing kui Eesti rahvusliku ajaloo kulminatsi-
oon,” Vikerkaar 10:11 (2003): 131–142; Kopõtin, “Rahvuslus ja lojaalsus Eesti sõjaväes,” 214, 
220.
40 The term originates from Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the semantics of historical 
time; translated and with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York; Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 259–75.
41 Laidoner at the graduation ceremony of the War Academy, 1 September 1938, Diary of 
the Commander-in-Chief, 1 September 1938, Eesti Riigiarhiiv [Estonian State Archive, part of 
Estonian National Archives, Tallinn, hereafter: ERA].2553.1.2. In his five-year report of 1939 
Laidoner underlined the including of history in the tests for entrance to War Academy, and 
the more thorough study of past wars at the courses of the Academy among his achievements. 
The C-in-C also noted that in order to support the spirit of the Independence War, more vet-
erans had been accepted in the Academy than in previous years, “Report on National Defence 
1934–1939,” ERA.2553.1.12.
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took centre stage in Laidoner’s strategic and tactical thinking. For exam-
ple in January 1937 Laidoner gave the following instructions to his sub-
ordinates:
From the point of view of war doctr[in] we cannot withdraw, we must 
defend on the border. The 1st Div[ision] – defend River N[arva], which is 
a formidable barrier even in winter. Foch a[fter] the war: “Push the bor-
der to Rhein and I will guarant[ee] that not a single Ger[man] will come 
through”. Despite this we will take care of posit[ions] also in the rear.
The 2nd D[ivision] up front in the mountains; pos[itions] the same 
as in I[independence] War…. Also here – to protect every step. At 
Võru – our position in I[independence] War was the hardest. We need 
to know every hill. The position at Petseri is good. There is no position 
at Võhandu. We must carry the str[ategic] doctrine over to tactics. We 
must not retreat.42
In these cryptic notes Laidoner repeatedly referred to the experience of 
the Independence War and the First World War. Considering the cata-
strophic defeat of the French in 1940, taking the model of static defence 
was quite unfortunate, and comparing River Narva to Rheine was like 
comparing a rifle to a howitzer.
Interestingly, Laidoner wanted to use the same principle of “active 
defence on the border” in tactics as well as in strategy. Probably he did 
not distinguish the operational level of war, even as this had been defined 
in the USSR already in the mid-1920s and codified in the doctrine of 
deep operations.43 The key idea in Laidoner’s thinking was a stiff defence 
in forward positions. Attack was to be used in case of enemy incursions: 
“In case of an enemy breakthrough the neighbouring unit will have a new 
42 Notes, 14 January 1937, Excerpts from documents about the work of subunits used to com-
pile the diary of the C-in-C, ERA.2553.1.61, 2.
43 The operational level of war was defined by Aleksandr Svechin at the Soviet General Staff 
Academy in the mid-1920s. His main treaties, which appeared in 1926, has been translated 
to English: Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy; edited by Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, Minn.: East 
View Publications, 2004). Laidoner’s ignorance about the operational level is strange, because 
journals and dissertations at the War Academy had discussed the development of the Soviet 
doctrine, e.g., Lt. Col. Johannes Vellerind, “Õhuoperatsioonid ja nende teostamine Nõukogude 
Vene ametliku doktriini ja sõjakirjanduse seisukohalt,” ERA.495.12.825.
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task – to cut off the unit that had penetr[ated].”44 This was quite an opti-
mistic plan, as it assumed that the Red Army would not engage and tie-up 
also the neighbouring units as was foreseen in the Soviet doctrine and 
would be seen in the Second World War practice.45 According to Lai-
doner, after local blows on the tactical level, there had to be an overall 
counter-offensive on the strategic level carrying the war to enemy terri-
tory, as had happened in 1919.46
At other times Laidoner contradicts himself: “The state border 
[line] has no tactical or strategic importance. But it is politically very 
important”.47 Nor did Laidoner think that everything had been perfect in 
the Independence War. On a battle tour to the Latvian border in May 1938 
the C-in-C said: “We must always nurture the mentality of enveloping the 
enemy, in order to avoid the mistake of the Independence War, where we 
tried to plug holes rather than to make a small raid in the enemy’s rear.”48 
He stressed envelopment also at the tactical games of the 3rd Division in 
March the same year.49
Defence in forward positions was dangerous, because in contrast 
to Finland, Estonia had no border fortifications to speak of. Following 
French examples, the Finns had begun constructing a 130-kilometre 
Mannerheim Line at the Karelian Isthmus already in the early 1920s. 
There were problems. Not all of the sections had been completed and not 
all of the firing positions were supporting each other. Tank obstacles were 
largely obsolete. The line could be compared to the French Weygand Line 
rather than to the famous Maginot’ Line.50
Estonia did not have even this. Moreover, the Estonian landscape was 
much better suited for tanks. No reserve positions were planned and con-
structed, leaving Estonian units on the border in danger of being encircled. 
44 Notes, 14 January 1937, Excerpts, ERA.2553.1.61, 3.
45 Polevoi Ustav RKKA (PU-39) (Moskva, 1939); David M. Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of Tacti-
cal Maneuver: Spearhead of the offensive (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 80–94; “Vene punaväe 
uue välieeskirja ilmumise puhul,” Sõdur 6-8 (1937), 187–8.
46 The Diary of the C-in-C, 18 September 1938, ERA.2553.1.2.
47 The Diary of the C-in-C, 29 May – 4 June 1938, ERA.2553.1.2.
48 Ibid.
49 The Diary of the C-in-C, 26 March 1938, ERA.2553.1.2.
50 Tuunainen, Finnish Military Effectiveness, 95
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Estonians had not recognised the strengths of the Sinimäed position, which 
would be later used by the Germans in 1944. According to the analysis of the 
1st Division, it was impossible to organise defence west of the River Narva 
and in case of a breakthrough, the enemy was supposed to be pushed back 
behind the river.51 Again, we see that officers were overconfident in their 
ability to liquidate enemy breakthroughs, but it is also possible that they 
reported what the C-in-C chief expected them to write.
Considering the Soviet doctrine of deep battle and deep operations, 
Laidoner’s instruction of 20 January 1939 to move the headquarters of the 
Võru-Petseri military district from Võru in the rear to Petseri on the bor-
der was highly dubious. Laidoner’s reasoning was as follows: “The push-
ing up of our forces closer to the border is a significant part of the gen-
eral plan of state defence, which demands strong and courageous active 
defence throughout the war as well as in the beginning.”52 The capturing 
of Petseri and the headquarters of the military district would have imme-
diately jeopardized the mobilization of reservists from the border regions.
Even more dangerous was Laidoner’s order from 1936 not to practice 
delay and withdrawal on tactical manoeuvers. Discussing deficiencies of 
the exercises of the 2nd Division with General Reek, Laidoner ordered: 
“Defence of each position is the duty to be carried out and the abandon-
ing of that position is a crime. We speak about fighting until the last drop 
of our blood but in exercises we do just the opposite.”53 This was probably 
meant as another means to instil morale in the troops, but in war, the idea 
that one should accept one’s encirclement rather than withdraw in time 
is suicidal. The same mentality allowed Hitler to encircle millions of Red 
Army troops, who had been ordered “Not a single step back!”, but Hitler’s 
own dilettantish leadership doomed the Sixth Army of General Paulus 
in 1942.54
51 “The operational and tactical assessment of the 1st Division of the (Narva) front. Syllabus,” 
ERA.515.1.825, 5.
52 “Notes about the official and diplomatic duties of General Laidoner,” 20 January 1939, 
ERA.2553.1.62.
53 The Diary of the C-in-C, 18 November 1936, ERA.2553.1.2, 137–38.
54 A classical treatise is John Erickson, Stalin’s War with Germany. Vol.1, The road to Stalingrad 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975).
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The tactics of the German Army Group Nord at the Narva front in 
1944 showed that the River Narva was not as formidable a barrier as Laid-
oner imagined. At some places the geography even favoured the attacker, 
for example near Riigiküla, where the eastern bank dominated over the 
western bank of the river. It was in that section in February 1944 where 
the Red Army crossed the river virtually on the march.55 The summer of 
1939 was extraordinarily dry, so that marshlands carried foot soldiers. 
At certain places the River Narva was only 1.5 metres deep, thus it was 
passable without special equipment.56 In winter time it was even easier to 
cross the river and operate in the large Krivasoo marshes next to it, as the 
winter of 1944 demonstrated. The German 1944 operations  FLAMINGO 
and SEEADLER further showed how important it was to trade space 
for time. With those retrograde actions the German army group laid 
the basis for further successful defensive operations on the Tannenberg 
(Sinimäed) Line in July 1944.57 There was at least one similarity with the 
Germans, however. Laidoner had recognised the importance of hold-
ing a bridgehead on the other side of the river, but this may have been 
the invention of the German army at the start of the Independence War, 
in November 1918.
To sum up this part one should say that the Estonian army had done 
well to train delay and withdrawal in the early 1930s. Laidoner forbade 
this in 1936. This is a speculation, but most probably many Estonian 
units would have faced encirclement by mobile Red Army units if war 
had started in 1939. It appears that Laidoner would have ordered them to 
defend rigidly their positions rather than delay, withdraw, reorganise and 
redeploy (which is of course not easy in practice).
Cultivating the legacy of the Independence War had negative conse-
quences for Estonian military effectiveness. Patriotism and nationalism 
may influence attitudes in a positive way, but these aspects are of second-
ary importance in terms of military capability. Training and discipline 
55 Andrew Michael Del Gaudio, “Operational Art and the Narva Front 1944, Sinimäed and 
Campaign Planning” (Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Liverpool, 2012), 177.
56  Salo, “Eesti kaitseväe valmisolek sõjaks,” 130.
57 Del Gaudio, “Operational Art and the Narva Front 1944,” 217. The German grouping in 
Narva and Jaanilinn was in danger of being encircled from the North and the South.
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are more important. It was not correct to prohibit practicing withdrawal. 
It was positive that Laidoner favoured aggressive tactics even in defence, 
but carrying offensive tactics over to the strategic level was overly opti-
mistic, and even reckless, considering the kind of enemy Estonia was fac-
ing. What the Estonian army really practiced in manoeuvres and what 
the exercises can tell us about its military effectiveness is the focus of the 
next chapter.
Manoeuvres
The purpose of exercises is to simulate combat situations, in order to train 
leaders, staffs and units for war time duties.58 It seems that theoretically 
Estonian army leadership had understood that purpose. For example, the 
journal Sõdur emphasised that future war would present a lot of surprises 
and leaders should learn to orient quickly in ever changing circumstanc-
es.59 However, in reality exercises rarely met those requirements. An issue 
of Sõdur of April 1937 ended with the blunt critique:
If both sides in the manoeuvres time and again act according to pre-
prescribed plans – today – approach, attack, seizure of enemy positions, 
exploitation, etc., and accordingly we send baggage trains to the respec-
tive points in advance, – tomorrow – defence and retreat and accordingly 
we load machine guns to sleighs already in the morning, so that later it 
would be easier and more comfortable to withdraw, then such manoeu-
vres hardly help develop resourcefulness and quick thinking and hardly 
give teams and leaders those lessons, which they really need.60
Despite such critical comments, nothing changed. In February 1940, the 
chief-of-staff Colonel August Kasekamp wrote a memo about organizing 
exercises:
58 FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
1984).
59 K.L., “Manöövrite korraldamisest,” Sõdur 14-15 (1937), 346–353.
60 Ibid., 353.
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Our manoeuvres and tactical exercises are always organized according 
to the same model and are dominated by bureaucratic paper work. The 
schemes, situations and other material on manoeuvres and tactical exer-
cises are often expanded to files of several dozens of pages. The course 
and the actions in those manoeuvres are often prescribed to the tiniest 
detail... In some cases, situations have been pre-planned for the entire 
manoeuvre and for all days in advance. This manner of envisaging the 
course of actions makes the directing of manoeuvres much easier, but 
this has also the result that the commanders do not need to have initia-
tive, manoeuvres become inflexible and uninteresting. In consequence, 
such predetermined manoeuvres do not give the necessary experiences 
and lessons for leaders...61
According to a US training manual, Estonian exercises were conducted 
according to controlled-play scenarios, in which leaders had to take spe-
cific actions in response to pre-determined events. Such scenarios give 
commanders less freedom of action than the so-called free-game scenari-
os.62 This was not good for the Estonian military effectiveness. Let us now 
study in more detail the two Estonian exercises, the manoeuvre of the 
2nd division in 1937 and the exercise of the 3rd division in 1938.
From 21 to 27 September 1937 the 2nd division organised a larger 
multiservice tactical exercise in the region between Tsirguliina and Võru 
in the South-East. The objective of the manoeuvre was to give the services 
the experience of cooperating in battle situations; leaders could acquire 
leadership experience, soldiers practical experience. Units could train 
fighting against armoured forces and air forces, and experiment operating 
with a “moto-mechanised” team.63 According to the scenario, the Blues 
blocked the advance of the attacking Greens invading from the east at the 
general line of Hargla-Karula-Urvaste-Kanepi. The Blues were aware that 
the Greens had had many losses and were exhausted, and could not bring 
enforcements from other sections of the front as they were advancing 
61 Memorandum, chief of staff Col. A. Kasekamp, 15 February 1940, ERA.515.1.825.
62 FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training.
63 The plan of the tactical manoeuvre of the 2nd Division for September 1937, 3 September 
1937, ERA.518.1.695.
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The first division was responsible for the defence of the North-
Eastern section of the front, while the second division defended in 
the South-East against the Soviet Union. Besides the 1st and the 2nd, 
there was also the 3rd division defending the western parts of the 
country. The formation of a fourth division was under way when 
Estonia was occupied by the USSR in 1940
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toward Tartu and Valga. Taking advantage of the favourable situation, the 
Blues launched a general counter-offensive in the morning of 22 Septem-
ber. The scenario gave the Blues precise orders for seizing the districts of 
Võru, Väimela and Leevi.64 The scenario can therefore be read as a con-
firmation of Laidoner’s vision of the future: the enemy attacking from the 
east is successfully punched back. The Blues do not delay or withdraw. 
There is a meeting engagement and the Greens are pushed successfully 
toward the east.
The summary of the exercise, preserved in the archive, describes the 
actions of units in detail and assesses their performance.65 One of the 
mistakes that were noted was the inflexibility of delivering operational 
orders. The drafting of orders took so much time that subunits had no 
time for reconnaissance in daylight. One can infer from this that orders 
were given for the next morning. As a solution to the problem it was 
recommended that tasks be delivered by oral fragmentary orders. “In 
conditions of manoeuvre warfare the delivering of fragmentary orders is 
unavoidable,” noted lieutenant colonel Lukas.66 This was very reasonable.
In the context of the need for faster leadership, the utility of radio 
communication was noted. However, this had been viewed with “some 
suspicion” by the commanders.67 The Greens had four, the Blues five 
D-type radios. The Greens were able to set up communications, but the 
Blues had not trained to operate the equipment and could therefore not 
establish radio communication. The transport of the radios was also a 
problem, because radios transported by horses and foot soldiers tended 
to fall behind combat units. It should be noted that radio was a key part 
in the conception and methods of the German manoeuvre warfare in 
the 1920s and the 1930s.68 Those developments were followed keenly 
by Soviet military theoreticians, who considered radio as a force mul-
tiplier that had given an edge to the German army in the campaign in 
64 The initial situation for the Blues, September 1937, ERA.518.1.695.
65 Summary of the tactical exercise of the 2nd Division, 21–27 September 1937, deputy chief of 
staff of the 2nd Division Lt. Col. J. Lukas, 17 December 1937, ERA.515.1.794.
66 Ibid., 269.
67 Ibid.
68 Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, 107–8; Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg, 116–118, 208–211, 206.
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France.69 At the same time one should note that Germany was clearly 
ahead of other countries: like Estonia, Britain went into war without a 
developed radio network.70
Next, lack of the mobility of the artillery was underlined. It was 
impossible to tow the 47-mm anti-tank gun by horses and foot soldiers 
and keep up with other units; the cavalry lacked integrated artillery 
entirely. Moreover, units were unable to engage the enemy inside defen-
sive positions in attack or in defence. According to the Estonian doc-
trine, defensive efforts had to be concentrated at the forward edge of the 
main battle position: all fire had to be concentrated onto that line.71 The 
exercise showed that units gave up the fight and the exercise was some-
times even adjourned when the enemy managed to penetrate the forward 
edge of the main defensive position. This was worrisome. It was rightly 
observed that the use of mechanised units by the enemy meant that pene-
trations of the defensive line had become unavoidable. Even so, there was 
no mention of the worst possible scenario for the defending Estonians 
– a break-through by enemy forces into the rear and the achievement of 
operational freedom.72
It was also noted that subunits were not following fire-and-move-
ment principles: infantry advanced without the support of machine guns. 
As usual in Estonian exercises, cooperation with artillery left much to 
be desired. The experiment with the moto-mechanised grouping was 
a failure. Vehicles were used only for movement, in battle, soldiers left 
the vehicles behind and fought on foot. Leaders lacked experience in 
motorisation and because of slowness and hesitation in decision-making, 
69 V. I. Usov, P. D. Kisliakov, “Upravlenie I sviaz' po opytu vtoroi imperialisticheskoi 
voiny,” Voennaia Mysl' 11-12 (November-December 1940): 77–85, cited by Jacob W Kipp, “Bar-
barossa, Soviet Covering Forces and the Initial Period of War: Military history and AirLand 
battle,” The Journal of Soviet Military Studies 1:2 (1988): 188–212.
70 Chad G. Clark, “Radio to Free Europe: Armored force radio development, Great Britain 
and the United States 1919–1941” (Unpublished MA Thesis: Nebraska University Lincoln, 
1999), 53.
71 Lahingueeskiri, Kaitsevägede staabi VI osakonna väljaanne (Tallinn, 1932), 51, 56.
72 Considering that an Estonian infantry platoon, which had to defend a front of 450–500 
meters, was armed only with rifles and two light machine guns, penetration by the enemy was 
more than likely. About platoon’s armaments, Salo, “Eesti kaitseväe valmisolek sõjaks,” 54.
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motorised units fell behind enemy units moving on foot. There was also a 
general “apathy” toward danger from the air.73
As we can see, the chief-of-staff of the division, who wrote that assess-
ment relying on referees’ reports and after-exercise discussions, was quite 
critical. Surprisingly, foreign military attachés were even more disapprov-
ing. The British attaché noted in his correspondence with the Foreign 
Office that the overall objective of the exercise seemed to be “confirming 
one’s general opinion of the poor value of the Estonian army.” Equipment 
was not modern and even if the Estonian army acquired some new sys-
tems, units needed time to get used to them. The attaché noted individual 
marksmanship as one of the strengths of the Estonian army. At the same 
time, the use of crew-served weapons and fighting against those weapon 
systems was neglected.74
The German attaché Colonel Rüssing reportedly agreed with the 
assessment of the British colleague, but the former predicted that due 
to recent procurements from Germany, Poland, and England the quality 
of the Estonian army would start improving fast. The German attaché 
agreed, however, that presently the Estonian army was much weaker than 
the Lithuanian army. The German attaché also noted that the purchases 
of armaments did not depend on the quality, or bilateral trade relations, 
but entirely on bribes, which everyone took, even President Päts, but not 
General Reek. The British representative, however, did not think Estonia 
was able to improve its military capability much in the future.75
A slightly more detailed British assessment has been preserved 
about the autumn manoeuvres of the 3rd division near Rapla on 6–10 
October 1938.76 This was the largest exercise of the 3rd division over 
the past several years. In the summary it was noted that the manoeu-
vre could be regarded as “entirely successful,” as it had demonstrated the 
steady rise of the quality of the training of units compared to previous 
73 Summary of the exercise of the 2nd Division from 21 to 27 September 1937, deputy chief 
of staff of the 2nd Division Lt. Col. J. Lukas, 17 December 1937, ERA.515.1.794. See also Salo, 
“Eesti kaitseväe valmisolek sõjaks,” 64.
74 “Estonian Army,” Consul Gallienne in Tallinn to Secretary of State, 28 December 1937, FO 
371/22226, NA.
75 Ibid.
76 For a short description see “3. diviisi sügismanööver,” Sõdur 41-42 (1938), 1011–1015.
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years.77 There were also deficiencies: the staff of the task force had no tele-
phone communication with the air force staff; the motorised company 
lacked the means of communication; radio was seldom used because the 
cipher was regarded as too complicated (even though a counter-intelli-
gence unit decoded it in five minutes). Despite the relatively large number 
of radios, communication could be established only in very few cases. 
Units lacked their own baggage trains, so logistics support was provided 
by hired transport. Infantry performance was considered as good, but the 
coordination of the artillery and other arms was, again, weak. Command-
ers of indirect fire support batteries did not seek contact with infantry and 
did not send forward observers up front. Just like at the exercise of the 2nd 
division, motorised units performed “essentially as motor transport.”
The assessment of the British representative was crushing. It was 
observed that this was an exercise in which the entire military district 
practiced mobilisation, and as usual defence and attack was learned. We 
can infer from this that Laidoner’s orders were followed and there was 
no practice of withdrawal. The attaché considered the overall quality of 
troops as “very low;” the level of the training and capabilities of senior 
officers as “low.” The quality of armaments was considered as “very bad.” 
The problem was the disparity of weapons; in order to reach even a satis-
factory level of standardisation, a lot of new armaments were needed. The 
British observer also noted the weak physique of conscripts born during 
the First World War, which left a mark on combat strengths. Despite the 
strong will to defend the country, the Estonian army “will not have any 
great fighting value,” the attaché concluded drily.78
Although Estonian exercises should be studied more thoroughly in 
the future, one can already conclude on the basis of those two exercises 
that there were important deficiencies in Estonian tactics. This view was 
shared by foreign military observers. It was natural that Estonian own 
summaries were not excessively negative, trying to remain construc-
tive and optimistic. The quality had certainly improved over the years. 
 Nevertheless, exercises were surprisingly rigid and unimaginative, which 
77 Summary of the excercise, 3 December 1938, commander of the division Major General 
Herbert Brede, ERA.521.1.416.
78 The British Attaché to the Foreign Secretary, 20 October 1938, FO 371/22226, NA.
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was not the best way to practice manoeuvre warfare.79 The problem was 
also that enemy qualities were presented unrealistically, which allowed 
the strengths of one’s own troops (the Blues) to be seen in a more favour-
able light. It is impossible to say at this stage of research whether the rea-
son for this was the wish to strengthen the morale, wrong analysis of Red 
Army capabilities, or the eagerness to comply with the wishes of the high 
command of the army.
Summary
This article was able to offer only a cursory perspective on the ideas of the 
Estonian army leadership on future war. Evidence showed that C-in-C 
Laidoner considered the experience of the Independence War as impor-
tant and was keen to draw on that experience not only to instil confidence 
before an uncertain future, but also to find practical lessons for future 
war. 
In this respect, it is illuminating to draw some parallels with the expe-
rience of another small country, Holland. Historians Frederic S. Pearson 
and R. E. Doerga have analysed the preparations of the Dutch army and 
reached the following conclusion:
Here was a case in which leaders perceiving threat were immobilized 
by a lack of perceived alternatives, by the existence of historical prece-
dents that enabled them to engage in wishful thinking, and by an inability 
to comprehend fully the extent of the adversary’s ambitions.80
The Dutch were in a similar situation to the Estonians. Whereas Esto-
nia had won the last war, Holland had been able to stay neutral and keep 
its territory untouched. Similar to Estonia, the Dutch could not imagine 
that the adversary would act as unpredictably and vigorously as it did, in 
79 “Summary of the major deficiencies found in the performance of the leaders at the military 
game of the 1st Division (13–15 March 1940), commander of the 1st Division, 1 May 1940, 
ERA.515.1.825.
80 Frederic S. Pearson, R.E. Doerga, “The Netherlands and the 1940 Nazi Invasion,” – Studies 
in Crisis Behavior, ed. Michael Brecher (New Brunswick, New Jersey: The Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem, 1978), 25.
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1940. Until the last moment the Dutch were engaging in wishful thinking, 
hoping that Germany would simply not attack. Like Estonia, the Dutch 
did not seriously consider foreign assistance.81
This article has not dwelled on the deliberations of the Estonian gen-
eral staff in August and September 1939. But the analysis of Laidoner’s 
ideas on tactics and strategy demonstrated that wishful thinking was the 
order of the day.82 The roots of the naivety are not difficult to find. It was 
the myth of the Independence War cultivated vigorously by the Päts-Lai-
doner regime. The spirit of the Independence War was propagated not 
only at the political level to assure the public’s support for the regime, 
but also in military strategy and tactics. On Laidoner’s orders the army 
adopted the concept of “active defence” on the borders, which prescribed 
attack and offensive action as the chief methods on the tactical and the 
strategic levels. Even while aggressiveness could be justified at the tactical 
level, Estonia did not have the technical means and the ability to develop 
aggressive manoeuvre warfare on the operational level. The analysis of 
the two major exercises showed that the Estonian army had insufficient 
firepower, protection (air defence and anti-tank) and the mobility neces-
sary to conduct large scale counter-attacks and counter-offensives.83
At this point it makes sense to draw on the assessment of foreign 
observers. According to Swedish military attachés, the common mistake 
of the Baltic states was their over optimism about their ability to beat 
the Russians. The Swedes thought that this misconception was based on 
incorrect analysis of the Baltic independence wars: in particular, Baltic 
officers did not understand the great difference between the well organ-
ised modern Red Army and the chaotic Bolshevik units who had fought 
at the fronts of the Civil War.84
The views of the Swedish attachés therefore confirm the findings of 
this study. It seems that the myth of the Independence War was often 
81 Ibid., 40.
82 Another example: “Vene punaväe uue välieeskirja ilmumise puhul,” Sõdur 6-8 (1937), 187–
188.
83 For current doctrinal requirements for executing successful manoeuvers, see Mõts, Maaväe 
lahingutegevuse alused, 95.
84 Eriksson, “Swedish Military Attachés,” 42.
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more important than military professionalism and competency. The spirit 
of the Independence War had to compensate for shortfalls in technology 
and training. But as August–September 1939 demonstrated, these mis-
conceptions were not as deep as to persuade the Estonian high command 
to decide for mobilisation for war against the Soviet Union (of course, 
this also depended on the decisions of politicians). It is very likely, how-
ever, that Laidoner’s concept of “active defence” would have caused great 
and unnecessary losses during the initial stages of the war and the Esto-
nian army would have been forced to re-orient and adapt very quickly. 
However, time is a precious commodity in war.85
One can thus conclude that the Estonian army was weakened not 
only by the belated procurement of modern weapons and the small fire-
power of its units – factors that have been analysed in earlier studies – but 
also by incompetent leadership, which particularly hurt effectiveness on 
the operational level of war. The inter-war period can be seen as a warn-
ing lesson for present and future senior officers, whose task is to develop 
operational plans that meet realistic threat scenarios and match the capa-
bilities of one’s own units.
Because of limited space, the article could not study several impor-
tant aspects that would throw additional light on the military mentality 
and operational concepts of the Estonian military. It focused on the ideas 
of General Laidoner, about which there are a few fragmentary pieces 
of evidence in the archives. Hopefully, future studies will help further 
elaborate Laidoner’s ideas.86 There are still no specialised studies on Esto-
nian military exercises, or theories of war developed in Estonian military 
academies, staffs, and by the journals Sõdur and Sõjateadlane (Military 
Scientist).87 Another interesting topic, which needs further research, 
is the influence of the military thought of other countries on Estonian 
85 According to Carl von Clausewitz, it is the third law of war, Carl von Clausewitz, On War; 
edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1989); see also Nikolai Reek, Aja kaotus – on surm: sõjaväe juhtivkoosseisu ettevalm-
istusest (Tallinn, 1921).
86 Urmas Salo, Kui Laidoner juhatas väge… Kindral Johan Laidoner Eesti sõjavägede ülem-
juhatajana 1934–1940 (manuscript in author’s possession).
87 But see Laanetu, “Eesti meresõjalise mõtte kullafond”.
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 doctrines. It would be interesting to know, for example, what was the 
impact of French ideas on the Estonian military, as several Estonian 
senior officers had been educated at schools in France.88
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